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A Conversation about Land
Cancellation and Release with
H. Murphey “Murf” McCloy
by John E. Stevens [ PM/WRA ]

Land Cancellation and Release in mine action is looked at by many experts as the next
logical step to the safe and time-effective return of mined areas. This interview examines
the benefits of the land-release method and addresses its criticisms.

H

umanitarian mine action is poised for another step forward via the Land Cancellation and Release approach. Unlike previous
mine-action developments that were largely systemic
(e.g., Landmine Impact Surveys) or technical (for example, the HSTAMIDS mine detector1), Land Cancellation and Release is essentially conceptual. It balances
surveys with risk-management assessments in order to
speed the rate at which Suspected Hazardous Areas can
be deemed safe and returned to productive use. In some

At the time this photo was taken in Azerbaijan, the hills in the distance were mined.
PHOTO COURTESY OF DEBORAH NETLAND, PM/WRA
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cases, Land Cancellation and Release may occur without any clearance.
Since the term humanitarian demining was introduced by American and other practitioners (United
Kingdom, France, etc.) or people in Afghanistan in
late 1988, its doctrines and practices have matured as
it spread to other conflict-affected countries. Many of
its technical approaches can be traced to World War II
and the extraordinary post-war clearance of mines and
explosive remnants of war that rendered western Europe largely impact- free a mere five years later. What
distinguished humanitarian demining—later expanded to the more holistic humanitarian-mine action—
in the latter half of the 20th century from its World
War II roots was an approach that sought to calculate precisely the scope and nature of the problem
in advance, followed by more rigorous clearance and
quality assurance. This approach, ultimately codified in the first edition of International Mine Action
Standards in 2001, assured that mine-affected populations could occupy their lands again safely and that
deminers would minimize risk to themselves.
The problem was that mine clearance that adhered to
IMAS inevitably increased demining costs and times.
IMAS’ high standards often introduced tensions between those donor nations, such as the United States,
which encouraged IMAS at every step, and mine-affected nations eager to speed economic development
and resettlement of populations while accepting greater

A Vietnamese Army Engineer Officer, trained to conduct Landmine Impact Surveys, interviews villagers in a hamlet in Quang Binh province, north of the old demilitarized zone, about the locations of ERW. This
interview took place during the final stages of a multi-million dollar Landmine Impact Survey in Vietnam that was funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement.
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human risk. I must confess that when I was
Program Manager for Vietnam, I insisted
that IMAS be followed to the letter.
Land Cancellation and Release will
change mine action again. To learn more,
I approached my colleague, H. Murphey
“Murf” McCloy, a humanitarian-demining

pioneer. Among other accomplishments, McCloy started the first
United States humanitarian-demining program in Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1996 in cooperation with United Nations mineaction authorities. This program morphed into internationally
supported programs in several Balkan countries that saved lives
and contributed to regional confidence-building. Our conversation about Land Release and Cancellation follows.
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This verdant grape vineyard in Afghanistan’s Shomali Valley was devastated by fighting and infested with landmines and ERW. Thanks to Roots of Peace, through support
from U.S.-government grants and private donors, the land was demined and safely replanted, and is again producing delicious grapes for consumption in the region.
PHOTO COURTESY OF ROOTS OF PEACE

Stevens: What exactly is land release?
McCloy: The latest draft of IMAS 08.20 (Land
Release), approved by the IMAS Review Board and that
should soon be published, defines it as “… the process
of applying all reasonable effort to identify or better
define Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) and remove
all suspicion of mines/ERW through Non-technical
Survey, Technical Survey and/or clearance using an
evidence-based and documented approach.”2
Stevens: What role do surveys play in the landrelease process?
McCloy: Surveys play a central role in the land-release process, for good and for bad. On the “good side,”
well-conducted surveys lay the groundwork for efficient
and cost-effective mine action by narrowing the size of
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the areas that are genuinely hazardous and that need
to be subjected to expensive, full-clearance measures.
Doing so has two major benefits. First, scant demining
resources are expended only on land that contains explosive threats. Second, some areas may be returned to
safe use through the application of much less expensive
survey measures alone—Non-technical Survey being the
least costly, and Technical Survey being more costly but
much less expensive than full clearance.
On the other hand, inaccurate or inadequate surveys can
distort the mine/ERW picture. This can result in an exaggeration of the explosive threat in an area, causing unnecessary
expenditure of clearance resources. Even worse, a “false clear”
conclusion can divert the application of more definitive survey/clearance measures from potentially dangerous ground,

thereby unnecessarily putting land users at risk.
Stevens: Given the need by donor
nations, nongovernmental organizations and individual contributors
to prioritize their limited funding,
how do mine-action programs determine the appropriate “end state”
to be reached?
McCloy: Programs don’t determine end state; stakeholders do. The
decision varies with the stakeholders.
The key stakeholders are the national
authorities of a mine-/ERW-affected
nation and the international donors

that support the mine-action efforts
of those authorities with funding and
other assistance.
For the national authorities, the
end state may be that point at which
the explosive threat to the population has been reduced to impact-free
or mine-free status, both of which involve a commitment to a long-term
effort. The impact-free approach
that the United States pursues envisions an end state in which “the last
citizen has been rendered safe from
the effects of mines.” The mine-free
end state, favored by advocates of
the Ottawa Convention ban on antipersonnel mines, envisions victory
“when the last mine (anywhere) has
been cleared/destroyed.”
For the foreign-government (donor) stakeholder, the end state can
take a variety of forms, depending on
the resources that the donor has, and
the donor’s assessment of the needs
and chances of success (defined in the
donor’s terms) in entering into a collaborative effort with the host nation
and other international supporters.
Each stakeholder must determine the appropriate end state for
itself, whether it is pegged to the
achievement of Ottawa Convention
commitments, such as eliminating
all mines within the national territory, or to shorter-term, pragmatic capacity-building goals (as is the
case of most U.S. humanitarian
mine-action assistance programs).
These goals are oriented toward
creating a host nation’s independent capability to plan, manage and
execute its national program with
or without external assistance.
The only stakeholder that is
guaranteed to “be there” until the
“last mine is cleared” end state is
the mine-affected nation itself.
Other stakeholders’ end states will
vary in scope and duration as dictated by their individual political
and humanitarian goals for the
host nation concerned and by their
available resources.

Stevens: Can these end states
be defined early in the process to
make it feasible to determine successful completion?
McCloy: Stakeholders/donors
can and should establish their initial end state during the mobilization phase while they are collecting
information on the situation in the
host nation and marshalling assets
to bring to bear on the problems
known to exist. Planning an end
state gives focus and purpose at the
outset to the coordination and execution of the assistance that will
be provided. This end state represents a goal to be achieved; objectives and other concrete measures
of effectiveness can be derived and
measured using this goal.
Initial end states are not immutable; an initial approach to mineaction assistance can be revised.
Conditions can change within the
political, socioeconomic security framework of a post-conflict
country, as can the end-state goals
of the individual donors/stakeholders. The important thing is
to have an end state in mind from
the start. Making changes from a
known point of reference is easier
and more economical in terms of
the expenditure of time, resources and political capital. It also provides a useful launch point from
which to elicit and gauge cooperative efforts from host-nation authorities and other stakeholders.
Stevens: What is an acceptable
level of residual risk?
McCloy: An acceptable level of
residual risk is what the respective
national mine-action authorities
say it is. Residual risk, as defined in
IMAS 04.10 Glossary of Terms (second edition, 1 January 2003), is: “In
the context of humanitarian demining, the risk remaining following
the application of all reasonable efforts to remove and/or destroy all
mine or ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth.”3
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According to the draft IMAS 08.20 Land Release, in
the process of determining when land can be released
from suspicion all reasonable efforts is “the level of effort required to achieve the desired level of confidence
that the land is free of mines/ERW.”2 Depending on
the evidence of explosive contamination gathered from
the survey techniques applied to a particular piece of
ground, “all reasonable efforts” can vary from “no further efforts are required to release the land” to “more
surveying is required to make a final determination,”
all the way to “full clearance measures must be applied
to this land before it can be returned to safe use.” It is
the responsibility of the various national mine-action
authorities to develop a national land-release policy, to
prepare and publish standards and guidelines governing the land-release program, and to include a definition of the criteria for “all reasonable efforts” for their
respective countries.
Stevens: Can people be confident that landmines/
ERW in a community have deteriorated sufficiently
to eliminate the risk of explosion?
McCloy: No. Landmine deterioration is a function
of many variables, including those induced by local soil
conditions, depth of burial, exposure to sunlight and
other weather phenomena, type of construction (hermetically sealed; plastic, metal or wooden casing; firing
mechanism, etc.), composition of the explosive charge,
age of the mine, time in the ground, and other factors.
There is no set of conditions that will guarantee that
all mines, even of the same type, will deteriorate to a
harmless state. In fact, it is possible for mines under certain conditions to deteriorate to an unstable state that
renders them more sensitive/susceptible to unintended
detonation than when originally manufactured.
Stevens: Can people be confident that all of the
landmines/ERW have been removed?
McCloy: No. In spite of the best efforts of human deminers, mine-detecting dogs and machines, there is always the possibility that an area formerly contaminated
with mines/ERW can contain some residual risk even after full clearance has been conducted properly. The methods and procedures prescribed in the clearance-related
IMAS are designed to ensure the removal or destruction
of all mine and ERW hazards within a specified area to a
specified depth. There are no 100-percent guarantees.
What the members of a mine-/ERW-affected community can be confident in is that if a thorough, well-documented and supervised process has been undertaken (i.e.,
all reasonable effort has been expended), this process will
reduce the residual risk to a “tolerable level” (i.e., a level
of threat low enough that they and other stakeholders are
convinced that the area can be returned to safe use).
This confidence is generated in the local population
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by the demonstrated reliability over time of the national mine-action authority, mine-action center and local/
international demining organizations to return areas to
safe use and to respond quickly and effectively in those
cases where additional threats are found in areas formerly considered cleared or free of mine/ERW threats.
Stevens: When does the need to use the land make
the risk worth taking?
McCloy: The risk is worth taking when the national
mine-action authority and other stakeholders, particularly the local/host-nation stakeholders, feel that it is
safe enough to use.
There is a movement by Ottawa Convention adherents and by some international funders of humanitarian mine action to expand the use of the full spectrum
of land-release methodologies to achieve a more expedient and cost-effective release of areas once deemed to be
mined. In a world of limited resources, lower-cost measures such as Non-technical and Technical Survey are
desirable alternatives to the full-clearance option. Mineaffected Ottawa States Parties are encouraged to adopt
land-release policies that include all three methods.
Ultimately, however, the disposition of mines/ERW
within the national territory of a mine-affected state
is the responsibility of the nation itself. Consequently, this is a decision for national authorities, with the
national mine-action authority responsible for developing a national land-release policy and relevant standards and procedures, hopefully in concert with other
stakeholders, to include international donors and the
local civilian community.
The international community can encourage mineaffected countries to adopt a comprehensive land-release
program, but it is up to the individual mine-affected
countries themselves to decide whether to do so, and
where and how such operations will be carried out.
Stevens: Isn’t Land Cancellation and Release a
sham that enables donor nations and mine-affected
nations alike to put a stamp of approval on sloppily
done work, or proceed on assumptions that are based
on questionable surveys that could endanger lives in
order to save money?
McCloy: Land Cancellation and Release is neither a
sham nor an internationally-orchestrated cost-cutting
measure that sacrifices the safety and well-being of civilian populations. It is instead a highly developed form of
risk management that serves to offset the problems associated with shrinking donor funding for mine action worldwide. It does this by achieving operational economies of
scale through database purification, along with the release
of land through the application of survey and clearance
methodologies appropriate to the threats confirmed
through adequate and accurate survey techniques.

There is no relaxing of standards regarding the level of evidence required to tailor survey or clearance
work to the specific tasks, nor is there any lessening or
“watering down” of the standards to which survey and
clearance operations must be performed. The aim is to
employ full clearance (the most costly) resources only
on genuinely hazardous areas identified through accurate and adequate survey techniques.
The standards/guidelines set forth in the newly adopted land-recovery-associated IMAS (IMAS 08.20
Land Release;2 IMAS 08.21 Non-technical Survey;4 and
IMAS 08.22 Technical Survey5), in conjunction with
the long-standing IMAS 09.10 Clearance Requirements6
(published in 2003) set forth procedures and methodologies that, if properly codified, published and enforced
by the respective national mine-action authority, will
return land to safe use at a lower cost with a tolerable
level of risk that is acceptable to all stakeholders, including the local civilian community.
Land Cancellation includes such activities as purging the national mine/ERW database of invalid (redundant/incorrect) Suspected Hazardous Area entries as
well as releasing land for safe use through a combination of Non-technical Survey, Technical Survey, and/or
full-clearance operations.
Stevens: The Ottawa Convention ban on antipersonnel landmines calls for the total elimination
of landmines. Does Land Cancellation and Release
undercut the goal of that ban?
McCloy: The Ottawa Convention process has
evolved into a position that reconciles the “total elimination” position previously accepted by all States
Parties with the cost-effective “all reasonable efforts/
tolerable risk” approach of the Land Cancellation and
Release process.
Annex C of IMAS 08.20 Land Release reads:
“Article 5.2 of the Mine Ban Convention [commonly
known as the Ottawa Convention] requires each
State Party to … make every effort to identify all
areas under its jurisdiction or control in which
anti-personnel mines are known or suspected to be
emplaced and [to] ensure as soon as possible that
all AP mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction
or control are perimeter-marked, monitored and
protected by fencing or other means, to ensure the
effective exclusion of civilians, until all AP mines
contained therein have been destroyed.”2
The sophistry involved in moving from the bottomline position of destroying all anti-personnel mines to
accepting the Land Cancellation and Release process is
that the statement above implies an obligation on the
part of States Parties to the Convention to ensure that
mined areas under their control are accurately surveyed,

and then perimeter-marked by fencing or other means.
The final connection between “destroying all mines”
and using “all available methods” (i.e., Non-technical
Survey, Technical Survey and clearance) to release land
in a more cost-effective manner is provided by a paper
titled “Applying All Available Methods to Achieve the
Full, Efficient, and Expedient Implementation of Article 5,”7 endorsed at the Ninth Meeting of States Parties
in November 2008.
Two of the key conclusions of this paper are that,
first, the States Parties acknowledge that land reassessment and release through non-technical means, when
undertaken in accordance with high-quality national
policies and standards that incorporate key principles
highlighted in this paper, is not a shortcut to implementing Article 5.1 but rather a means to more expediently release with confidence areas at one time deemed
to be mined.
Second, three main activities can be undertaken to
assess and, where applicable, to release land that has
been previously identified and reported as part of a
“mined area”: Non-technical means, Technical Survey
and clearance.
Note that it is the responsibility of the national authorities of the mine-affected countries to make this
work. This responsibility is also reflected in the duties
of the national mine-action authority as set forth in the
land-release-related IMAS.
Annex C of IMAS 08.20 states that while proponents
of the Ottawa Convention have tried to make a similar connection between survey and the elimination of
mines/ERW for the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (to which the United States is a State
Party), the implied connection between “all reasonable
precautions” and “survey” is not nearly as compelling.
Stevens: At the humanitarian mine-action
workshop hosted by China in April 2004, several
Western demining organizations intimated that
Chinese demining procedures at the time were not
up to IMAS standards, imperiled both deminers
and the affected populations, and were harmful
to the environment. The Chinese defended their
approach as “practical, reliable, simple, and lowcost—and particularly suited for mine-clearance in
developing countries.” This approach was rejected by
the Western participants, in part because it implied
that the lives of people in developing countries were
not as worthy as those in richer countries. Doesn’t
the new Land Cancellation and Release IMAS
essentially echo the Chinese approach?
McCloy: While the Chinese demining procedures
were definitely low-cost, they were not in accordance
with the IMAS. In the case of the Land Cancella13.2 | annual issue | august 2009 | the journal of ERW and mine action | focus | 

Reconciling Real-world Situations with Formal
Land Cancellation and Release

PHOTO COURTESY OF THE HALO TRUST

The three scenarios below help to explain some of the
dilemmas mine-action authorities face when implementing
Land Cancellation and Release policies.
Sri Lanka. The above photo depicts a freshly cultivated field
on the Jaffna Peninsula, directly adjacent to some red minefield
demarcation stakes. The area was cleared in one day. When the
deminers arrived the next day, a farmer had already plowed to
the red stakes. In this case, one could say that the farmer conducted de facto quality assurance/quality control. What is the
Sri Lankan national mine-action authority to do?
Angola. Here is a hypothetical scenario drawn from real
situations: A key dirt road connects two towns in Angola. It
was reportedly mined and the adjoining areas may well be
mined. Yet, for the past year residents have used this road
with trucks, 4x4s and animal-drawn carts without suffering
any injuries or deaths from mines. Should the Angolan national
mine-action authority declare victory in this area and focus its
demining resources exclusively on other hazardous areas?
Cambodia. Here is another hypothetical situation inspired
by actual scenarios: One or more polygons on a Landmine
Impact Survey of a district in Cambodia indicate that the areas
in question are mined. Yet, for the last three years farmers
in this allegedly mined area have been intensively cultivating
their rice paddies and have not suffered any injuries or deaths.
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Should the Cambodian national mine-action authority still
make an effort to survey the land before declaring it safe, or
should they use their limited resources to clear other land that
is definitely mined?
In all three cases, the answers to the real-world situations described above would have to be provided by the
countries’ national mine-action authorities. The national
mine-action authorities could all release areas “empirically cleared” based on the evidence available. There must
still be a process undertaken to define the actual limits of
the areas declared tolerably free from the risk of mines.
The use of the land without adverse consequences in
the three examples cited above does provide evidence
(and here I stress evidence, not proof) that these areas
contain no explosive threats and may not need to be
subjected to full clearance in order to be returned to safe
usage. Nevertheless, these areas still need to be accurately
defined in terms of grid coordinates and turning points (like
any other piece of cleared ground), and officially released
only after being subjected to the land-release processes
and procedures specified by the national mine-action
authority of the respective country.
To further illustrate, a national mine-action authority may
feel that the fact that a farmer has plowed certain ground
without encountering a mine may be due more to luck than
to the actual absence of explosive threats, and, therefore,
would require more stringent (and costly) final proofs to release land plowed only once, but would require less costly measures for land that has been plowed two times or
more. Similarly, while the roadbeds of well-traveled sections
of road may be considered for release short of full clearance, the fact is that there is much less compelling evidence
that there are no explosive threats present on the adjacent
slopes. Consequently, the roadbeds may be defined and
released after less costly and time-consuming measures
while the accompanying verges of these same sections of
road may require much more work to achieve release. In
the end, it will all depend on the proofs/procedures specified by the national mine-action authority. Given the same
conditions in different countries, the proofs and procedures
could be different in each situation, depending on how the
national authorities view “tolerable risk.”

tion and Release process being espoused through the new IMAS,
there are definite standards that
cover this process and acknowledge the potential residual risk to
affected populations while presenting procedures/methodologies to
keep the risk at a level acceptable
for all stakeholders (tolerable risk),
including the civilian population.

If I were a local that needed the
land to feed my family, I would
probably feel the same way. Above
all, I think that the risk management inherent in the land-release
process is far superior in terms of
lower risk/higher safety than doit-yourself village demining (or
informal demining as it is now
called), which is what many inhab-

The Chinese level of risk was risk defined by default, or lack of
adherence to appropriate international standards.

The Chinese level of risk was
risk defined by default, or lack of
adherence to appropriate international standards. The new IMAS
land-release level of risk is a function of conscious design with the
savings in time and money carefully weighed against safety, and it
is contingent on the thoroughness
of the various survey and clearance processes.
Stevens: Which would you
rather visit: a known mined area
that had been cleared to traditional IMAS standards, or a
once-suspected mined area that
had simply been released following a data-collection exercise
with accuracy and thoroughness
certified by the host government
but unknown to you?
McCloy: All things being equal,
naturally I would feel confident that
the residual-risk potential would
be lower for an area subjected to
full clearance than for that released
through survey alone. However, if I
trusted in the abilities of each link
in the mine-action chain, I would
not hesitate to visit either area you
described, although I would probably be more “situationally aware”
in the survey-released area.

itants of threat areas must resort to
because of the needs-resources priorities gap that delays mine action
for years.
The more I know about mine action—to include the role and effectiveness of the national mine-action
authority and the operational reputations of the mine-action center
and the demining organizations
performing the survey/clearance
work—the more confident I am
about where I can safely venture.
See Endnotes, page 62
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